Deployment controls for a customer-facing AI chat application

Endpoint contract, environments, and failure states

Begin with the interface the application can actually depend on: request and response schemas, streaming behavior, timeouts, retry rules, conversation identifiers, error codes, and the actions the endpoint may request. Pin the tested endpoint version and separate preview from production. A branded interface cannot hide an unstable contract; it needs visible states for waiting, partial response, rejected input, upstream failure, expired session, and a safe retry that does not duplicate an action.

Record the domain, hosting account, runtime, environment-variable names, deployment command, health check, log location, and rollback target. The release receipt should identify the application commit and endpoint version together, because a working front end connected to a changed backend is a different product state. Test the empty conversation, long response, interrupted stream, repeated submission, small screen, keyboard navigation, and a cold session without relying on the implementer's browser state.

Authentication and authorization at the action boundary

Authentication establishes the user identity; it does not by itself authorize every action the assistant can propose. Microsoft documents authenticated and unauthenticated Copilot Studio configurations and warns that an unauthenticated link allows anyone with the link to interact. The application needs a named identity provider, session expiry, logout path, account-recovery owner, and role checks in the downstream system that executes each tool call.

OWASP's guidance on excessive agency recommends minimum tool functionality, minimum permissions, downstream authorization, and human approval for consequential actions. Apply those controls to concrete paths. A viewer may ask questions but cannot write. An operator may draft a change but must confirm before submission. An administrator may manage roles but should not expose a generic privileged token to the assistant. The denied path belongs in the acceptance suite, not only the successful path.

Logs, data boundaries, and release evidence

Define which conversation events are recorded, why they are needed, who can view them, how long they remain, and how deletion is executed. Keep credentials and raw access tokens out of message logs. Redact or exclude sensitive payload fields before storage, and make the operator interface distinguish user text, model output, tool request, authorization decision, tool result, and human confirmation. That structure supports incident review without presenting the entire transcript as one undifferentiated blob.

Relayfront implements and records these controls through Reality Contact, LLC. The buyer supplies the data policy and approval roles, reviews the five acceptance scenarios, and decides when the surface may be shown to the pilot cohort. The deployment report describes tested behavior and known limits; it does not certify the application as secure or compliant.

Where the service stops

Reality Contact, LLC builds and verifies the application surface but does not certify security or regulatory compliance, conduct penetration testing, decide the buyer's lawful basis for data processing, operate customer accounts indefinitely, or authorize users for production access. The buyer approves the roles, consent language, retention policy, production domain, and five scenarios, then invites the approved pilot cohort and retains authority over every account and privileged action. This is application implementation and technical verification; it does not replace the buyer's legal, privacy, security, accessibility, or production-readiness review. We do not promise that the application is attack-proof, compliant with every rule, free from defects, continuously available, or safe for scenarios outside the accepted scope.